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Summary
To improve the organization and capabilities of the U.S. intelligence
community, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
(9/11 Commission) recommended, among other things, that two entities be
established — a National Intelligence Director (NID) and a National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC).  The commission said that the NID should be
located within the Executive Office of the President (EOP), and said the NCTC
should report to the NID.  Legislation designed to create these entities would place
them either within the EOP (e.g., H.R. 5024 and H.R. 5050) or within an independent
entity outside of the EOP (e.g., S. 2774 and H.R. 5040).
Questions have been raised regarding a number of issues associated with the
establishment of the NID and the NCTC.  One set of such questions centers on
whether these proposed entities would be covered by various “general management
laws” — broad statutes designed to regulate the activities, procedures, and
administration of all or most executive branch agencies in such areas as regulatory
and information management, financial management, procurement, and strategic
planning.  Earlier in 2004, CRS published a compendium of these general
management laws and a companion report on major themes from these laws, with
possible management policy options (CRS Report RL30795, General Management
Laws: A Compendium; and CRS Report RL32388, General Management Laws:
Major Themes and Management Policy Options).
This report examines whether more than 50 general management laws (e.g., the
Administrative Procedure Act, the Inspector General Act, and the Competition in
Contracting Act) would cover the NID and the NCTC under two scenarios: (1) if the
entities were established within the EOP, and (2) if the entities were established as
or within independent entities in the executive branch.  The analysis focuses on the
coverage of the selected management laws, not on whether the laws are likely to
affect or apply to the NID or the NCTC.  Also, some of the laws allow exemptions
or contain other provisions that can affect their coverage. 
In general, the report indicates that more of these management laws would
appear to cover the NID and NCTC if they were created as independent entities in the
executive branch than if they were placed within the EOP.  In many cases, it was
unclear whether the statutes’ definitions of covered “agencies” included entities
within the EOP.  The report also indicates that Congress, if it so desires, could
indicate that the NID and the NCTC would be covered by these management laws by
either (1) amending the text of each of the management laws or (2) delineating in the
statute creating the entities the particular management laws that should cover them.
This report will be updated if additional information becomes available about
the coverage of the management laws or if legislation creating the NID and the
NCTC (or similar entities) is enacted.  
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1U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11
Commission Report (Washington: GPO, July 22, 2004), p. 399.
General Management Laws and the 
9/11 Commission’s Proposed Office of 
National Intelligence Director (NID) and 
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11
Commission), established by the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003
(P.L. 107-306; 116 Stat. 2383, at 2408), criticized the structure of the U.S.
intelligence community.1  To improve the intelligence community’s organization and
capabilities, the commission recommended (among other things) that two entities be
established — a National Intelligence Director (NID) and a National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC).  The commission said the NID should be located
within the Executive Office of the President (EOP), and said the NCTC should report
to the NID.  Legislation designed to create these entities would place them either
within the EOP or within an independent entity outside the EOP.
This report examines whether more than 50 general management laws (e.g., the
Administrative Procedure Act, the Inspector General Act, and the Competition in
Contracting Act) would cover the NID and the NCTC under two scenarios: (1) if the
entities were established within the EOP, and (2) if the entities were established as
or within independent entities in the executive branch.  The report also discusses how
Congress, if it so desires, can indicate that these proposed entities would be covered
by these management laws.  First, however, the report provides some background
information on the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations and recent efforts to
restructure the intelligence community.  
Background
The 9/11 Commission questioned whether the U.S. government, and the
intelligence community  in particular, are organized adequately to direct resources
and build the intelligence capabilities that the U.S. will need to counter terrorism, and
to address the broader range of national security challenges in the coming decade.
The commission recommended, among other things, that 
[t]he current position of Director of Central Intelligence should be replaced
by a National Intelligence Director with two main areas of responsibility: (1)







7This report identifies legislation introduced or announced as of Sept. 15, 2004.  For a
discussion of this debate, see CRS Report RL32506, The Position of Director of National
Intelligence: Issues for Congress, by Alfred Cumming.  See also CRS Report RL32501,
9/11 Commission Recommendations: New Structures and Organization, by Harold C.
Relyea.
8See, for example, S. 2645 (107th Cong.), introduced June 19, 2002.  For legislation in the
108th Congress, see  S. 6, introduced on January 7, 2003; S. 190, introduced on January 17,
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the U.S. government and (2) to manage the national intelligence program
and oversee the agencies that contribute to it.2
The commission said the NID would be the principal intelligence advisor to the
President, and “would submit a unified budget for national intelligence that reflects
priorities chosen by the National Security Council, an appropriate balance among the
varieties of technical and human intelligence collection, and analysis.”3  The
commission said the NID should be located in the EOP, would have a “relatively
small staff of several hundred people,” would be confirmed by the Senate, and would
testify before Congress.4  The commission also recommended
the establishment of a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), built on
the foundation of the existing Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC).
Breaking the older mold of national government organization, this NCTC
should be a center for joint operational planning and joint intelligence,
staffed by personnel from the various agencies.  The head of the NCTC
should have authority to evaluate the performance of the people assigned to
the Center.5
The commission said the head of the NCTC should be appointed by the President,
be confirmed by the Senate, testify before Congress, be equivalent in rank to a deputy
head of a cabinet department, and report to the NID within the EOP.6  The NCTC
would override the current arrangement, in which the principal players — the Central
Intelligence Agency and the Departments of Defense and Justice — were seen by the
commission as operating without effective coordination and cooperation.
Legislation to Restructure the Intelligence Community
The 9/11 Commission’s recommendations and several subsequent legislative
initiatives are the most recent contributions to a debate on structural reform of the
intelligence community that began nearly 50 years ago.7  During the 107th and 108th
Congresses, several Members of Congress have introduced legislation that would
establish a position of Director of National Intelligence, or would strengthen the
authority of the Director of Central Intelligence.8 
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2004; S. 1520, introduced on July 31, 2003; H.R. 4104, introduced on April 1, 2004; and
H.R. 4584, introduced on June 16, 2004.  For a discussion of these legislative proposals, see
CRS Report RL32506, The Position of Director of National Intelligence: Issues for
Congress, by Alfred Cumming.
9According to a news report, the 9/11 Commission’s vice chairman, Lee H. Hamilton, “said
he withdrew the panel’s proposal that the new national intelligence director be part of the
executive office of the president, citing opposition from both the White House and
Congress.”  Helen Dewar and Charles Babington, “Intelligence Retooling on Agenda as
Congress Returns,” Washington Post, Sept. 8, 2004, p. A4.
10Ibid.
11For the press release, see [http://www.senate.gov/~gov_affairs/index.cfm?Fuseaction=
PressReleases.Detail&PressRelease_id=796&Month=9&Year=2004&Affiliation=R], visited
Sept. 20, 2004. 
12See [http://www.senate.gov/~govt-aff/_files/091504billsummary.pdf], p. 2, visited Sept.
20, 2004.
For example, on September 7, 2004, a bipartisan group of Senators introduced
legislation (S. 2774) to implement the recommendations made by the 9/11
Commission.  In particular, the legislation would create an Office of the NID and the
NCTC.  However, in contrast to the commission’s recommendation, the legislation
would place the NID and the NCTC  within an independent entity (the National
Intelligence Authority), not within the EOP.9  A House companion bill (H.R. 5040)
was introduced on September 9, 2004, by Representative Christopher Shays (with 32
cosponsors).  
On September 8, 2004, House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (with 117
cosponsors) introduced a bill (H.R. 5024) to implement the recommendations of the
9/11 Commission, including the establishment of the NID and NCTC.  In contrast to
the bills mentioned above (and consistent with the recommendations of the
Commission), the legislation would place the proposed entities within the EOP.
Another bill (H.R. 5050), introduced on September 9, 2004, by Representative Sheila
Jackson-Lee, would establish a Director of National Intelligence within the EOP.
A news report stated that a “leadership bill” will be introduced by the end of
September, reportedly by Speaker of the House J. Dennis Hastert.10  
On September 15, 2004, Chairman Susan Collins and Ranking Member Joseph
Lieberman of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs announced legislation
to “reform the Executive Branch of the nation’s intelligence community.”11
According to a fact sheet, the proposed entities would be placed in a National
Intelligence Authority, not within the EOP.12  Other legislation designed to establish
the NID and the NCTC continues to be introduced.
On August 27, 2004, President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13355,
which was intended to strengthen the position of the Director of Central
CRS-4
13Executive Order 13355, “Strengthened Management of the Intelligence Community,” 69
Federal Register 53593, Sept. 1, 2004.
14Executive Order 13354, “National Counterterrorism Center,” 69 Federal Register 53589,
Sept. 1, 2004.
15CRS Report RL30795, General Management Laws: A Compendium, coordinated by
Clinton T. Brass; and CRS Report RL32388, General Management Laws: Major Themes
and Management Policy Options, by Clinton T. Brass.
Intelligence.13  On the same day, he also issued Executive Order 13354, which
established the NCTC, over which the Director of Central Intelligence “shall have
authority, direction, and control.”14  On September 8, 2004, President Bush indicated
that the Administration sought legislation that would establish the NID position
within the Executive Branch, but not within the EOP.  
NID and NCTC and the Coverage of 
General Management Laws
General Management Laws
Questions have been raised regarding a number of issues associated with the
establishment of the NID and the NCTC.  One set of such questions centers on
whether these proposed entities would be covered by various “general management
laws” — broad statutes designed to regulate the activities, procedures, and
administration of all or most executive branch agencies in such areas as regulatory
and information management, financial management, procurement, and strategic
planning.  Earlier in 2004, CRS published a compendium of these general
management laws and a companion report on major themes from these laws, with
possible management policy options.15
To determine the coverage of these management laws in relation to the proposed
NID and NCTC, CRS examined the scope of the laws under two scenarios — if the
entities were established (1) within the EOP or (2) as or within independent entities
in the executive branch.  In both scenarios, CRS assumed that the entities would be
established by Congress.  This review included more than 50 such laws, but did not
include laws related to human resource management (Title 5 of the United States
Code) or intergovernmental relations (e.g., the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act).
Table Showing Coverage of Laws
Table Structure and Contents. A table indicating the coverage of each
management law in each scenario is included at the end of this report. The first
column of the table identifies the general management laws and their locations in the
table of contents for the previously mentioned compendium of these laws.  The next
three columns provide CRS’s best judgment regarding the coverage of each of the
laws if the NID and the NCTC were established in the EOP — i.e., whether (1) the
entities appear to be covered by the law; (2) the entities do not appear to be covered
by the law; or (3) it is not clear if the entities would be covered.  The next three
CRS-5
16Some laws have provisions in which determinations of coverage are mixed.  For example,
in the EOP scenario, the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 has some provisions that would not
cover the proposed entities, but also has provisions in which coverage is not clear.
Conversely, in the independent agencies scenario, some provisions of the act would appear
to cover the proposed entities, but others would not.  
columns indicate CRS’s best judgments regarding the coverage of these laws if the
NID and NCTC were established as independent entities within the executive branch.
The last column indicates the CRS subject matter experts who may be contacted for
further information about each of the general management laws.  (For legal issues
that relate to definitions of “agency,” T. J. Halstead (7-7981) and Morton Rosenberg
(7-7480), in CRS’s American Law Division, are also available for further information
and assistance.)
Summary of Findings.  In general, this analysis indicated that more of these
general management laws would appear to cover the NID and the NCTC if they were
created as or within independent entities in the executive branch than if they were
established within the EOP.  In many cases, it was unclear whether the statutes’
definitions of covered “agencies” included entities within the EOP.  Therefore, if
Congress chose to establish the proposed entities, the coverage of these management
laws would appear to depend on where the entities were established.  
Within the EOP.  If the NID and the NCTC were established within the EOP,
about half (26) of the  general management laws included in this report would appear
to cover, in whole or in part, the proposed entities.16  Eleven of the laws would not
appear to cover the entities within the EOP, and it was not clear whether they would
be covered by 18 of the laws.  For example, several of the statutes indicated they
covered any “department, agency, or instrumentality” of the U.S. government, but it
was not clear whether this construction would include the EOP or any of its
constituent parts.  Of the 11 laws that did not appear to cover the entities, four did not
cover the entities because the laws had expired.  (These laws were included in the
CRS compendium because of continuing congressional interest in the subjects.)  In
other of these “not covered” cases, the laws (e.g., the Inspector General Act of 1978
and the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act of 1982) specifically list the
covered agencies, and do not include the EOP; nor would they include the proposed
entities.  
Independent Entities.  If the NID and the NCTC were established as or
within independent entities in the executive branch, more than 75% (42) of the
general management laws would appear to cover, in whole or in part, the proposed
entities.  In many cases, where it was unclear that a particular management law
covered an “instrumentality” or “independent entity” within the EOP, it was more
clear that the law would cover an independent agency or other entity within the
executive branch.  Of the 12 laws that did not appear to cover the entities, four would
not do so because the laws have expired, and others did not appear to cover the
entities because they were not included in a list of covered agencies.  In only one case
was it unclear whether the management law would apply to an independent entity.
CRS-6
175 U.S.C. § 551(1).
Considerations Regarding Table Contents
Several points are important to consider with regard to the table’s contents:  (1)
the analysis focuses on the coverage of the selected management laws with respect
to the NID and the NCTC, not whether the laws are likely to affect or apply to these
proposed entities; (2) the coverage of some of the laws in these scenarios is unclear;
(3) Congress has previously exempted certain agencies from the coverage of some
of the management laws; and (4) certain provisions in some of the laws may affect
their coverage.  
“Coverage” Versus “Application” of the Laws.  This report focuses on
whether an entity is covered by a statute, not on whether the law is likely to affect or
apply to the entity’s operations.  For example, the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)
specifically identifies the EOP in its definition of a covered “agency.”  Therefore, if
the NID and the NCTC were created as part of the EOP, we concluded that they
would be covered by the PRA.  However, if these entities never imposed any
paperwork requirements on the public that triggered the PRA’s requirements, the act
would not affect or apply to their operations.  Similarly, the National Environmental
Policy Act might cover these entities (particularly if they were established as
independent entities within the executive branch), but they might never take actions
that triggered the requirement in the act for an environmental impact statement.
Coverage Sometimes Unclear.  CRS determined whether the selected
management laws would appear to cover the NID and the NCTC in particular
scenarios based on the definitions and other terms provided in these laws — most
commonly, how the terms “agency” or “executive agency” were defined.  In some
cases, however, determining the coverage of these management laws was difficult.
As noted previously, this difficulty was most common in determining whether certain
statutes applied to entities within the EOP.  For example, the Federal Records Act
covers any “independent establishment” in the executive branch, but this term is not
defined in the act.  Given the nature and missions of the various offices within the
EOP (i.e., to help develop and implement the policies and programs of the President),
it is not clear whether the NID or the NCTC would be considered “independent
establishments” for purposes of the act if established within the EOP.  In some cases,
the coverage of these management laws might turn on the interpretations of the
courts.  
It should also be noted that coverage of the NID and the NCTC would not be
ensured even in instances where the statutory definition either seems broad enough
to include the EOP, or specifically includes the EOP within its ambit. For example,
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) defines “agency” to include “each authority
of the Government of the United States, whether or not it is within or subject to
review by another agency.”17 While this definition could arguably apply to any
governmental entity, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
has established that “the APA confers agency status on any administrative unit with
CRS-7
18Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1073 (1971).
195 U.S.C. § 552(f)(1).
20Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d 1288, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
21This standard is likewise applicable to the Privacy Act, which incorporates the definition
of “agency” as used in FOIA.
22GPRA is codified at 5 U.S.C. prec. § 301, § 306; 31 U.S.C. § 1101 and nt, §1105, §§ 1115-
1119, prec. § 9701, §§ 9703-9704; 39 U.S.C. prec. § 2001, §§ 2801-2805. If precedent were
followed, it is possible that the NID and the NCTC would be excluded from GPRA’s
coverage.  According to the 9/11 Commission report, the NCTC would “be built on the
foundation of the existing Terrorist Threat Integration Center” (p. 403), which is located in
the CIA.  The CIA was excluded from GPRA’s coverage by 5 U.S.C. § 306(f).  According
to GPRA’s legislative history, the CIA was excluded largely because most of its budget is
classified, and because the GPRA plans and reports it would prepare would be classified (S.
Rep. 103-58, Government Performance and Results Act of 1993).  OMB reported to
Congress in 1997 that “OMB consulted with the Agency leadership about this matter, and
the CIA agreed to comply voluntarily with the basic provisions of GPRA” (The Government
Performance and Results Act, Report to the President and Congress from the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget, May 1997.)  Congress subsequently enacted P.L.
104-293, the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY1997, to require performance reports on
intelligence activities, requirements, and evaluations (Secs. 803 and 808 of P.L. 104-293).
substantial independent authority in the exercise of specific functions.”18 This
standard has been of particular importance in the context of the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA), even though the act specifically includes the EOP in its
definition of “agency.”19  In Meyer v. Bush, for instance, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia determined that the Task Force on Regulatory
Relief was not subject to FOIA even though it was located in the EOP, based on the
fact that its duties were advisory in nature and that it “was not a body with
‘substantial independent authority’ to direct executive branch officials.”20
Accordingly, the  determination in the attached chart that the APA and FOIA would
appear to cover the NID and the NCTC as part of the EOP is predicated upon the
assumption that these entities would, in fact, be imbued with “substantial
independent authority” in the exercise of their functions.21
Exemptions from Coverage.  As the attached table indicates, many of the
management laws that CRS examined would appear to cover the proposed NID and
NCTC as part of the EOP, as independent entities, or in either situation.  Congress
could, however, exempt one or both of these entities from the coverage of certain
laws — just as it has done for other entities engaged in sensitive or intelligence-
related activities.  For example, Congress specifically exempted the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) from requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee
Act (Section 4 of 5 U.S.C. Appendix 1), from “law and regulations relating to the
expenditure of government funds” (50 U.S.C. § 403j(b)), and from the Government
Performance and Results Act (GPRA; 5 U.S.C. § 306(f)).22  Some of the management
laws also allow other entities to exempt certain agencies or activities from coverage.
For example, GPRA allows the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to exempt
agencies with annual outlays of $20 million or less from certain requirements.
CRS-8
23As alternatives, see CRS Report RL30795, General Management Laws: A Compendium,
coordinated by Clinton T. Brass, or call the CRS experts listed in the table.
Certain Provisions Can Affect Coverage.  For some of the general
management laws included in the attached table, even though these laws would
normally cover the proposed NID and NCTC, certain provisions could affect this
coverage.  For example, the entry for the Davis-Bacon Act notes that, while the act
would appear to cover the NID and the NCTC (either as part of the EOP or as
independent entities), the President can suspend the act during a “national
emergency.”  Also, the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act of 1990 technically does
not cover the EOP, but a 1999 amendment to the act created a separate CFO for the
EOP.  The President can, under this amendment, determine what authority and
functions apply to the CFO for the EOP.  Although the table notes several of these
provisions, it should not be relied upon to highlight all important nuances in the
coverage of general management laws.23
Congress Could Indicate Whether 
Management Laws Cover NID and NCTC
If Congress decided to create the NID and the NCTC and wanted to indicate that
these entities should be covered by certain management laws, two general approaches
would be available — (1) amending the text of each of the relevant management laws
to indicate that the entities being created should be considered covered by these laws,
or (2) including a provision in the statute creating these entities indicating which of
the management laws cover them.  Although either of these general approaches
would accomplish this objective, each has particular advantages and disadvantages.
Amending the Management Laws
In the first approach, Congress, after creating the NID and the NCTC, could
consider amending the text of selected general management laws to indicate clearly
that they cover the new entities.  For example, the Chief Financial Officers (CFO)
Act of 1990 lists the agencies covered by its requirements at 31 U.S.C. § 901(b).  If
Congress wanted to have the CFO Act cover one or both new entities, Congress
could add the entity or entities to this list, and thereby put the complete list of
covered agencies at one location in the United States Code.  Similar action would be
required for each of the statutes that Congress considers relevant.  A possible
advantage of this approach would be that, in comparison to the second alternative,
it would be easier for an interested party to determine the coverage of a specific
general management law when specific agencies were delineated.  However, this
approach also could have several disadvantages.  For example, making changes in
statutory language to dozens of particular statutes would likely be significantly more
difficult than the alternative approach, and more likely to result in jurisdictional
issues among congressional committees.  
CRS-9
Identification of Management Laws 
in Statute Creating NID/NCTC
In the second approach, Congress could specifically delineate the particular
management laws that should cover the NID and the NCTC in the statute creating
them.   This listing of management laws could include all such laws that Congress
considers relevant (including those that already would appear to cover the proposed
entities) in order to clearly establish congressional intent.  Alternatively, the listing
could focus only on either those statutes that do not appear to cover the new entities,
or those for which coverage is uncertain.  
In either case, the statute creating the entities could state that they “shall be
considered to be covered by the requirements of ...,” with a listing of all relevant
management laws provided (e.g., the Federal Register Act and the APA).  Or, more
specifically, the statute could include language defining a covered “agency” (or other
term, depending on the specific management laws) by referring to the definitions in
the management laws themselves, such as the following:
The [NID/NCTC] shall be considered to be a covered “agency” for purposes of
the Administrative Procedure Act, as defined at 5 U.S.C. 551(1); ... [add other
applicable management laws and code citations].
Some potential advantages of this general approach include relative ease of
statutory drafting and fewer jurisdictional issues than with the first approach
(amending each management law).  However, this approach might make it more
difficult for an interested party to determine the coverage of a given law (particularly
for those laws that list the covered agencies), because to do so, the party would have
to find all provisos of interest, which might be included in many parts of the United
States Code.  For example, if the statute creating the NID and the NCTC indicated
that one or both of the entities should be covered by the CFO Act, an interested party
attempting to compile a list of agencies with CFOs  would have to know to examine
not only the CFO Act, but also the statute creating the new entities.  
Evaluating Options: 
Standardization vs. Customization
When considering whether these general management laws should cover the
proposed NID and NCTC, if any, or whether alternative or new management-related
laws should be enacted, Congress might consider an issue that it has previously
confronted when reorganizing or creating agencies — whether all (or virtually all)
these management laws should cover all (or virtually all) agencies, or whether each
agency should be governed by a customized set of these laws.  Some assert that the
laws should cover as many agencies as possible, arguing that less coverage would
lessen the laws’ importance and influence, and would potentially make it more
difficult for Congress to hold the President and agencies accountable for their
administration.  Others contend that each agency is sufficiently different to merit
individualized attention, and that there should be no presumption of coverage with
regard to any specific agency — particularly with regard to intelligence agencies or
other entities that deal with sensitive or classified information.  For analysis and
CRS-10
discussion of potential advantages and disadvantages of approaches to these
decisions, see CRS Report RL32388, General Management Laws:  Major Themes
and Management Policy Options, pp. 13-15.  
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